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1 Introduction
The money metric utility of an individual is the minimum income, computed at reference
prices, that she needs to reach a bundle that is at least as good as her actual bundle
(McKenzie, 1957; Samuelson, 1974). Money metric utility forms the basis of applied
welfare analysis. It is for example standard practice to evaluate policy reforms by the
change in money metric utility using as reference prices the pre-reform prices (the Hick-
sian equivalent variation) or post-reform prices (the Hicksian compensating variation).1
However, several theoretical objections have been raised against the aggregation of
money metrics.2 The most powerful critique came from Blackorby and Donaldson (1988).
They show that the money metric utility function is in general not concave. This implies
that a standard (quasiconcave) social welfare function defined over money metrics may
fail to approve transfers from richer to poorer individuals.
Figure 1 illustrates the problem. Individuals 1 and 2 have identical preferences over
the goods a and b. A bundle δ is transferred from the richer individual 2 to the poorer
individual 1.3 The distances between the straight lines represent the changes in money
metric utility (for some reference price vector). Clearly, the transfer is leaky: the gain
in money metric utility of the poorer individual is smaller than the loss of the richer
individual. Therefore, only a social welfare function exhibiting a sufficiently high degree
of inequality aversion would approve the depicted transfer. Moreover, by changing the
shape of the indifference curves, the leak can be made arbitrarily large. This means
that no social welfare function approves all richer-to-poorer transfers, with the exception
of Rawlsian social welfare functions—such as maximin or leximin—that assign absolute
priority to the poorer of the two individuals.
This observation has given rise to two far-reaching and opposing responses. Blackorby
and Donaldson (1988, p. 129) conclude negatively, stating that “social welfare analysis
based on money metrics is flawed.” Fleurbaey and Maniquet (2011, p. 21), by contrast,
conclude that “this observation . . . , instead of undermining the approach, can serve to
justify the maximin or the leximin as aggregation criteria.” Although the two responses
are diametrically opposed, they share the premise that the approval of richer-to-poorer
transfers is an essential requirement for all social welfare rankings.
We question this premise. We argue that not every richer-to-poorer transfer is an
unequivocal improvement. Such a transfer, while improving equity, may have the side
effect of worsening the overall efficiency of the distribution. To see this, note that the
transfer in Figure 1 transforms an efficient distribution—with equal marginal rates of
1See Slesnick (1998) for an overview.
2See Fleurbaey (2009, pp. 1052-1055) for a discussion.
3The transfer depicted in Figure 1 yields post-transfer bundles that are convex combinations of the
pre-transfer bundles. Blackorby and Donaldson (1988) impose this as a restriction on richer-to-poorer
transfers. This restriction is not essential, however, and we will not impose it in our analysis.
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Figure 1. A transfer in goods that is leaky in money metrics
substitution—into an inefficient distribution. Hence, the judgment of whether a partic-
ular transfer improves social welfare depends on the position one takes with respect to
the equity-efficiency trade-off. By insisting that all transfers must be approved, regard-
less of the associated efficiency losses, Blackorby and Donaldson (1988) and Fleurbaey
and Maniquet (2011) implicitly take the extreme stance that gives absolute priority to
equity over efficiency. In this light, it is not surprising that they arrive at such strong
conclusions.
We introduce a transfer principle that requires to approve only those transfers that
preserve efficiency. This obviously requires a way to measure efficiency. Rather than
choosing among the many efficiency measures that have been proposed in the literature—
see Diewert (1985) for an overview—we focus on what they have in common. All these
measures quantify efficiency by what could be disposed of without lowering any indi-
vidual’s utility. Formally, they measure the distance between the actual societal bundle
(listing the total amounts of all goods) and the Scitovksy boundary (collecting the min-
imum societal bundles that can deliver to each individual the same utility level as her
actual utility level). We define an efficiency-preserving transfer as a transfer that changes
neither the societal bundle, nor the Scitovksy boundary. All efficiency measures unan-
imously agree that such a transfer preserves efficiency. Our transfer principle demands
that only efficiency-preserving transfers have to be approved.4
4Chambers and Hayashi (2012) also make use of the Scitovsky boundary to study social welfare rank-
ings, but for a very different purpose. Their interest lies in informational parsimony. They require the
social ranking of two distributions to depend solely on the aggregate data contained in the corresponding
Scitovsky boundaries. This excludes any concern for equity, which is precisely our focus.
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We combine the efficiency-preserving transfer principle with the basic axioms anonym-
ity, continuity, monotonicity, and a version of welfarism. Our main result has two impli-
cations. First, a continuous, strictly increasing, and Schur-concave social welfare function
defined over money metric utilities satisfies all five axioms.5 Contrary to the conclusion
of Blackorby and Donaldson (1988), the use of money metrics in social welfare analysis
can be justified. In particular, since any standard social welfare function over money
metrics is admissible, it is not necessary—contrary to the conclusion of Fleurbaey and
Maniquet (2011)—to adopt a Rawlsian social welfare function. Second, and more strik-
ingly, the opposite is also true: only if the social ranking can be represented in this
particular form, then it satisfies all axioms. In sum, we show not only that one can, but
also that one must aggregate money metrics.
We proceed as follows. Section 2 introduces notation and the five axioms. Section 3
presents and discusses the main result. Section 4 concludes.
2 Axioms
2.1 Preliminaries
The set of individuals in society is N = {1, 2, . . . , n}. Each individual i has a bundle
xi in X = Rm+ . For two bundles x and y in X , we write x ≥ y if xk ≥ yk for each
k = 1, 2, . . . ,m, we write x > y if x ≥ y and x 6= y, and we write x  y if xk > yk for
each k = 1, 2, . . . ,m. We denote the boundary of the set A ⊆ X by ∂A.6 The sum of
two subsets A and B of X is defined to be the set of all sums of an element of A and an
element of B. That is, A+B = {z ∈ X | z = x+ y with x in A and y in B}.
Each individual i has a preference relation Ri over bundles in X . As usual, xRiy
means that bundle x is at least as good as bundle y according to individual i, whereas
Pi and Ii denote the corresponding strict preference and indifference relations. We write
xRiA to denote that bundle x is at least as good as all bundles in set A according
to individual i. For a bundle-preference pair (xi, Ri), the better-than set is B(xi, Ri) =
{y ∈ X | yRixi}. We sometimes use Bi as shorthand for B(xi, Ri). Individual preferences
belong toR, the set of complete, transitive, continuous, monotone, and convex preference
relations.7
5Schur-concavity is a weak version of concavity that is standard in the literature on inequality mea-
surement. See, e.g., Dasgupta, Sen, and Starrett (1973).
6Let ‖x−y‖ be the Euclidean distance between bundles x and y. The boundary of the set A (relative
to X ) is defined as ∂A = {x ∈ A | for each ε > 0, there is a bundle y in X \A such that ‖x− y‖ < ε}.
7A preference relation Ri is complete if xRiy or yRix for all x and y in X . It is transitive if xRiy and
yRiz imply xRiz for all x, y, and z in X . It is continuous if each better-than set and each worse-than
set is closed. It is monotone if x y implies xPiy for all x and y in X . It is convex if each better-than
set is convex.
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A distribution X = (x1, x2, . . . , xn) in X n contains a bundle for each individual in N .
We refer to the sum of all bundles x1 +x2 + · · ·+xn as the societal bundle. A preference
profile R = (R1, R2, . . . , Rn) in Rn contains a preference relation for each individual in
N .
A social ranking specifies for each preference profile a social preference relation over
all distributions.8 Formally, a social ranking % maps each preference profile R in Rn
into a complete and transitive social preference relation %R on X n. We use X %R Y
to denote that distribution X is at least as good as distribution Y in terms of social
welfare. The relations R and ∼R denote the corresponding strict social preference and
social indifference relations.
2.2 Three basic axioms
We define three basic axioms. Anonymity requires that switching the bundles of two
individuals with the same preferences does not change social welfare.
Anonymity: For each preference profile R in Rn, for each distribution X in X n, and for
all individuals i and j in N such that Ri = Rj, we have (x1, . . . , xi, . . . , xj, . . . , xn) ∼R
(x1, . . . , xj, . . . , xi, . . . , xn).
Continuity ensures that small changes in distributions do not lead to large changes
in their social ranking.
Continuity: For each preference profile R in Rn, for all distributions X and Y in X n,
and for each sequence of distributions {Xk}k∈N that converges to X, if Xk %R Y for
each k in N, then X %R Y , and if Y %R Xk for each k in N, then Y %R X.
Although continuity excludes leximin, the axiom is compatible with social preference
relations arbitrarily close to leximin.
Monotonicity imposes that increasing all amounts in some individual’s bundle im-
proves social welfare.
Monotonicity: For each preference profile R in Rn and for all distributions X and Y
in X n, if xi ≥ yi for each individual i in N and xi  yi for some individual i in N , then
X R Y .
Individual preferences are monotone. Therefore, monotonicity of the social ranking is
implied by the Pareto principle (obtained by replacing ≥ in the monotonicity axiom by
Ri and  by Pi). Note that, conversely, the combination of all our axioms implies the
Pareto principle (see Lemma 1 below).
8Thus, we focus on social comparisons for a fixed population with a given preference profile. It is
straightforward to extend the analysis to comparisons across societies with different population sizes
and preference profiles.
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Figure 2. General example
2.3 Reference set welfarism
We impose reference set welfarism as our fourth axiom.9 To the best of our knowledge,
this version of welfarism underlies all existing approaches that base social welfare rankings
on ordinal and non-comparable individual preferences (see Fleurbaey and Blanchet, 2013,
Chapter 4, for an overview). For elementary axiomatic underpinnings of reference set
welfarism, see Cato (2016) and Piacquadio (2016).
Reference set welfarism prescribes two steps to rank distributions. The first step
uses a list of reference sets to cardinalize each individual situation—a bundle-preference
pair—into a utility value. The second step uses the resulting vectors of individual utility
values to rank distributions. We now turn to a discussion of reference sets and their use
in reference set welfarism.
Reference sets are sets of bundles. Consider a list of nested reference sets. Each refer-
ence set is labelled using a real number, with larger sets receiving larger numbers. These
real numbers are used to cardinalize bundle-preference pairs. Each bundle-preference
pair is assigned a utility value equal to the number of the reference set that is just tan-
gent to the indifference curve through the bundle. Figure 2 shows three nested reference
sets, labelled by the nonnegative real numbers α, β, and γ, with α < β < γ. For the
depicted bundle-preference pair (xi, Ri), the assigned utility value is β.
We stress that the obtained utility values are treated as interpersonally comparable.
Two individuals whose indifference curves are tangent to the same reference set are as-
signed the same utility value, and hence are regarded as equally well-off. The choice
of a list of reference sets determines how interpersonal comparisons are made and must
therefore be based on value judgments. Our axioms, and especially the transfer princi-
9Fleurbaey (2009) refers to reference set welfarism as the equivalence approach.
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Figure 3. Quantity metric and money metric utility
ple, make these value judgments explicit and, as we will demonstrate, put considerable
structure on the shape of the reference sets.
We now formalize the properties of a list of reference sets S = (Sλ)λ∈R+ . A list
contains a compact reference set Sλ ⊆ X for each λ in R+, starts from the origin (S0 =
{0}), expands in a strictly nested way (λ < µ implies Sλ ⊂ Sµ and ∂Sλ ∩ ∂Sµ = ∅), and
has no gaps (the union of all boundaries ∪λ∈R+∂Sλ is equal to the set of bundles X ).
Because individual preferences are monotone, we can, without loss of generality, require
additionally that each list satisfies free disposal (if x belongs to Sλ, then each bundle
y ≤ x belongs to Sλ). Let S be the set of all lists of reference sets that satisfy these
properties.
For a given list of reference sets S in S, the utility value assigned to a bundle-
preference pair (xi, Ri) is the greatest number λ for which xiRiSλ. Accordingly, the
reference set utility function uS is defined as
uS(xi, Ri) = max{λ |xiRiSλ} for each xi in X and each Ri in R. (1)
The properties of the preferences in R and of the lists of reference sets in S ensure
that the reference set utility function uS in equation (1) is well defined, unique, and
continuous (in bundles). This utility function represents the preference relation, i.e., for
all bundles x and y in X , we have uS(x,Ri) ≥ uS(y,Ri) if and only if xRiy.
Before we state the axiom reference set welfarism, we define two prominent reference
set utility functions.10 The quantity metric utility function, illustrated in the left-hand
panel of Figure 3, is defined by equation (1) with Sλ = {x ∈ X |x ≤ λr} for a fixed refer-
ence bundle r  0.11 Quantity metric utilities were introduced by Samuelson (1977) and
Pazner and Schmeidler (1978) in welfare economics. The money metric utility function,
10See the discussion in Deaton and Muellbauer (1980, pp. 179-182).
11We use 0 to denote a vector of zeroes of appropriate length.
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which we denote by up, is illustrated in the right-hand panel of Figure 3. The function up
is defined by equation (1) with Sλ = {x ∈ X |
∑m
k=1 pkxk ≤ λ} for a fixed reference price
vector p 0. Money metric utilities were introduced by McKenzie (1957) and Samuel-
son (1974), and applied in welfare economics by Deaton (1980), King (1983), Ravallion
and van de Walle (1991), Creedy and He´rault (2012), and Chiappori and Meghir (2014),
among others.
Reference set welfarism requires that welfare comparisons are based on reference set
utility values only. For a list of reference sets S, a distribution X, and a preference profile
R, we abbreviate the vector of reference set utilities (uS(x1, R1), uS(x2, R2), . . . , uS(xn, Rn))
by uS(X,R).
Reference set welfarism: There exists a list of reference sets S in S and a binary
relation %∗ defined over reference set utility vectors in Rn+ such that, for each preference
profile R in Rn and for all distributions X and Y in X n, we have
X %R Y if and only if uS(X,R) %∗ uS(Y,R),
where uS is the reference set utility function defined in equation (1).
We conclude this section by combining reference set welfarism with anonymity, con-
tinuity, and monotonicity. A social ranking satisfies these four axioms if and only if the
social ranking can be represented by a continuous, strictly increasing, and symmetric
social welfare function defined over reference set utilities. We state this straightforward
result without proof.
Lemma 1: A social ranking % satisfies anonymity, continuity, monotonicity, and ref-
erence set welfarism if and only if there exists a list of reference sets S in S and a
continuous, strictly increasing, and symmetric social welfare function W : Rn+ → R such
that, for each preference profile R in Rn and for all distributions X and Y in X n, we
have
X %R Y if and only if W (uS(X,R)) ≥ W (uS(Y,R)),
where uS is the reference set utility function defined in equation (1).
The four axioms in Lemma 1 leave open the question of which list of reference sets
to use.12 Our final axiom, the efficiency-preserving transfer principle, will determine the
shape of the reference sets.
12The social ranking in Lemma 1 satisfies the Pareto principle. Indeed, the social welfare function W
is strictly increasing and the utility function uS is a representation of individual preferences.
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2.4 An efficiency-preserving transfer principle
Underlying the conclusions of Blackorby and Donaldson (1988) and Fleurbaey and Mani-
quet (2011) that we discussed in the introduction, is their acceptance of a strong transfer
principle that we define as follows.13
Societal-bundle-preserving transfer principle: For each preference profile R
in Rn, for all distributions X and Y in X n, and for all individuals i and j in N such that
Ri = Rj, if X is obtained from Y by a richer-to-poorer transfer from j to i (yi  xi 
xj  yj and xk = yk for k 6= i, j) that preserves the societal bundle (xi + xj = yi + yj),
then X %R Y .
The transfer in this principle preserves the societal bundle, but may considerably
worsen the efficiency of how this societal bundle is distributed. The transfer depicted
in Figure 1 illustrates this point: it preserves the societal bundle, but takes us from an
efficient distribution (where the marginal rates of substitution are equal) to an inefficient
distribution (where they are unequal). We introduce a weaker transfer principle that
requires only the approval of those transfers that preserve efficiency.
We develop a concept of efficiency-preservation based on the two building blocks
of the efficiency measurement literature: the actual societal bundle and the Scitovsky
boundary. The Scitovksy boundary collects the minimum societal bundles able to deliver
to each individual the utility level she obtains in the actual distribution (Scitovsky, 1942).
Formally, for a distribution X and a preference profile R, the Scitovsky set is defined
as the sum of the better-than sets B1 + B2 + · · · + Bn and the Scitovsky boundary is
∂(B1 + B2 + · · · + Bn). A distribution is efficient only if its societal bundle lies on the
Scitovksy boundary: for the given societal resources, no individual can be made better
off without making any other individual worse off. Common to all efficiency measures
in the literature is that they quantify inefficiency as the distance between the societal
bundle and the Scitovsky boundary. What distinguishes these efficiency measures is how
they define distance. Diewert (1985) provides a general overview.
Figure 4 gives an example for the case of two individuals and two goods. Both
panels of the figure show distribution X = (x1, x2) and the corresponding better-than
sets B1 and B2. The societal bundle is x1 + x2 and the Scitovsky boundary is the
boundary of the Scitovsky set B1 + B2. Note that distribution X is not efficient: the
societal bundle does not lie on the Scitovsky boundary, but rather in the interior of the
Scitovsky set. The two panels illustrate the two dominant approaches in the efficiency
measurement literature, referred to by Diewert (1985) as the quantity-oriented and price-
13This transfer principle only considers transfers among individuals with the same preferences. Fleur-
baey and Trannoy (2003) show that without this restriction the transfer principle directly clashes with
the Pareto principle. See Weymark (2013) for an overview of impossibility results in this vein.
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Figure 4. Quantity-oriented and price-oriented efficiency measures
oriented approaches. The left-hand panel illustrates the quantity-oriented measures of
Allais (1943) and Debreu (1951). Allais (1943) measures inefficiency as AC/BC, the
relative distance between the societal bundle and the efficient bundle A that contains
less only of a nume´raire good (here good a). Debreu (1951) measures inefficiency as
DC/OC, the relative distance between the societal bundle and the efficient bundle D
that is proportional to the societal bundle. The right-hand panel illustrates the price-
oriented approach, proposed by Hicks (1942) and Boiteux (1951). For the given reference
price vector p = (pa, pb), inefficiency equals pa × EF , or the distance, expressed in
expenditure terms, between the societal bundle and the cheapest bundle HB on the
Scitovsky boundary.
Our efficiency-preserving transfer principle requires the approval of each richer-to-
poorer transfer that keeps the societal bundle and the Scitovsky boundary fixed. These
restrictions on the transfer guarantee, as shown above, that all efficiency measures unan-
imously agree that the transfer preserves efficiency.
Efficiency-preserving transfer principle: For each preference profile R in Rn,
for all distributions X and Y in X n, and for all individuals i and j in N such that
Ri = Rj, if X is obtained from Y by a richer-to-poorer transfer from j to i (yi  xi 
xj  yj and xk = yk for k 6= i, j) that preserves efficiency (xi + xj = yi + yj and
B(xi, Ri) +B(xj, Rj) = B(yi, Ri) +B(yj, Rj)), then X %R Y .
Both the efficiency-preserving and the societal-bundle-preserving transfer principles
generalize the unidimensional Pigou-Dalton transfer principle. The Pigou-Dalton trans-
fer principle requires approval of richer-to-poorer transfers in income (the single good)
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that preserve total income (the societal bundle). Because preserving the efficiency of
the distribution reduces to preserving the societal bundle in the unidimensional set-
ting, the Pigou-Dalton transfer principle is also efficiency-preserving. We claim that
the efficiency-preserving transfer principle captures an aspect of the unidimensional
Pigou-Dalton transfer principle that the societal-bundle-preserving transfer principle
does not. The former two transfer principles are silent on the equity-efficiency trade-
off because the considered transfers improve equity, without changing efficiency. The
societal-bundle-preserving transfer principle, in contrast, does take a stance regarding
the equity-efficiency trade-off and, as we have argued, an extreme stance. Transfers
that only preserve the societal bundle improve equity, but may cause arbitrarily large
efficiency losses. Our efficiency-preserving transfer principle does not exclude such an
extreme stance, but is moreover compatible with more moderate ethical positions.
3 Result
Recall that Lemma 1 leaves open the choice of the reference set utility function. Theo-
rem 1 singles out the money metric utility function by adding our efficiency-preserving
transfer principle to the four axioms in Lemma 1. A natural additional consequence is
that the social welfare function must be Schur-concave.14 The proof of Theorem 1 is in
the appendix.
Theorem 1. A social ranking % satisfies anonymity, continuity, monotonicity, refer-
ence set welfarism, and the efficiency-preserving transfer principle if and only if there
exists a vector p in Rm++ and a continuous, strictly increasing, and Schur-concave social
welfare function W : Rn+ → R such that, for each preference profile R in Rn and for all
distributions X and Y in X n, we have
X %R Y if and only if W (up(X,R)) ≥ W (up(Y,R)) ,
where up is the money metric utility function using p as the reference price vector.
Theorem 1 gives necessary and sufficient conditions for a social ranking to satisfy the
five axioms. The sufficiency part states that any standard social welfare function defined
over money metric utilities satisfies the axioms. More strikingly, the necessity part states
that the axioms are satisfied by this particular social ranking exclusively. We discuss in
turn the sufficiency and necessity parts of the theorem.
To understand the sufficiency part, note that if a transfer preserves efficiency, then
it also preserves the sum of money metric utilities. We show this in the first part of
14A function W : Rn+ → R is Schur-concave if W (Qx) ≥ W (x) for each vector x in Rn+ and for each
bistochastic matrix Q. A matrix Q in Rn×n+ is bistochastic if each row sum and each column sum is
equal to 1.
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the proof. It follows immediately that any Schur-concave welfare function defined over
money metric utilities will approve efficiency-preserving transfers.
The sufficiency part stands in sharp contrast to Blackorby and Donaldson (1988).
They show that a standard social welfare function defined over money metric utilities fails
to satisfy the stronger—and in their view essential—societal-bundle-preserving transfer
principle.15 Theorem 1 demonstrates that aggregating money metrics is perfectly justi-
fied if one adds the sensible requirement of preserving efficiency while transferring goods.
The sufficiency part of the theorem furthermore contrasts with Fleurbaey and Maniquet
(2011). They too view the societal-bundle-preserving transfer principle as essential, but
conclude that a Rawlsian social welfare function must be used. Indeed, if one drops
continuity and imposes the societal-bundle-preserving transfer principle together with
the three remaining basic axioms anonymity, monotonicity, and reference set welfarism,
then the only option is to use leximin as the aggregation criterion.16 Our result shows
that the efficiency-preserving transfer principle admits the whole spectrum of inequal-
ity aversion, ranging from the inequality neutral sum-utilitarian case to the extremely
inequality averse Rawlsian case.
The necessity part of Theorem 1 shows that we must use money metric utilities. No
other reference set utilities can be used. We illustrate the intuition by showing that ag-
gregating quantity metric utilities—a prominent alternative to aggregating money metric
utilities—is not permissible. The second part of our proof generalizes this intuition. Fig-
ure 5 depicts an efficiency-preserving transfer of a bundle δ from individual 2 to individual
1. Because the indifference curves are piece-wise linear and parallel, and because the sum
of the kink points remains the same before and after the transfer (k1 + k2 = k
′
1 + k
′
2),
the Scitovsky boundary also remains the same. The bundle r is the reference bundle.
The gain and loss in quantity metric utilities can be read from the horizontal axis. If we
rotate the lower segments of the four indifference curves upwards, then we still have an
efficiency-preserving transfer that must be approved. Yet, the gain in quantity metric
utility of the recipient becomes smaller, whereas the loss of the donor remains the same.
It is clear that the gain can be made arbitrarily small without changing the loss. By
consequence, no continuous social welfare function defined over quantity metric utilities
can approve all transfers.
15It is easy to show that, more generally, no social ranking satisfies the societal-bundle-preserving
transfer principle together with anonymity, continuity, monotonicity, and reference set welfarism.
16Leximin, combined with any reference set utility function, satisfies the societal-bundle-transfer prin-
ciple and the three other axioms. Keeping continuity, but weakening monotonicity (by requiring X R Y
only if xi  yi for each individual i in N), yields maximin instead of leximin.
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Figure 5. Aggregating quantity metric utilities is not permissible
4 Conclusion
We have provided an ethical justification to aggregate money metrics. Our core axiom is a
transfer principle based on transfers that preserve the overall efficiency of the distribution.
This efficiency-preserving transfer principle—in combination with four basic axioms—
characterizes a continuous, strictly increasing, and Schur-concave social welfare function
defined over money metric utilities.
We conclude with two questions for further research. First, our result justifies the
use of a standard unidimensional social welfare function defined over money metrics.
This raises the question of whether the use of a unidimensional poverty or inequality
measure over money metrics is also justified. For poverty, this requires the identification
of the poor—a challenge in a setting with heterogeneous preferences—and to incorporate
a focus on the poor into the axioms.17 For inequality, the so-called normative approach
can be used. In this approach, inequality is defined as the social welfare gain that
could be obtained by optimally redistributing the societal bundle.18 In a setting with
homogeneous preferences, we have argued elsewhere that it is important to decompose
this social welfare gain into an equity gain and an efficiency gain, with only the equity
gain capturing true inequality (Bosmans, Decancq, and Ooghe, 2015). We leave the
extension to heterogeneous preferences for future work.
17See Decancq, Fleurbaey, and Maniquet (2014) for a proposal.
18An alternative is to define inequality directly, rather than deriving it from a social welfare function.
The key issue in this direct approach is to replace the monotonicity axiom by an invariance axiom. For
example, a ratio-scale invariance axiom could require that, for a profile of homothetic preferences, if all
bundles are multiplied by the same factor, then inequality remains the same.
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Second, the main theorem does not tell us which reference price vector should be
used to compute money metric utilities. A pragmatic solution is to fix a particular set
of reference price vectors and to only focus on welfare comparisons that are robust to
the choice of price vectors within this set. A more fundamental, but more challenging
approach, is to think of appealing axioms—presumably depending on the particular
context—that would reduce the set of admissible reference price vectors.
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Appendix: Proof of Theorem 1
Theorem 1. A social ranking % satisfies anonymity, continuity, monotonicity, refer-
ence set welfarism, and the efficiency-preserving transfer principle if and only if there
exists a vector p in Rm++ and a continuous, strictly increasing, and Schur-concave social
welfare function W : Rn+ → R such that, for each preference profile R in Rn and for all
distributions X and Y in X n, we have
X %R Y if and only if W (up(X,R)) ≥ W (up(Y,R)) ,
where up is the money metric utility function using p as the reference price vector.
Sufficiency. Each Schur-concave function is symmetric. Hence, by Lemma 1 a social
ranking % that can be represented by a continuous, strictly increasing, and Schur-concave
social welfare function W defined over money metrics utilities satisfies anonymity, conti-
nuity, monotonicity, and reference set welfarism. We now show that efficiency-preserving
transfers do not decrease social welfare.
The sum of money metric utilities is∑
i∈N
min{p′yi | yiRixi},
which equals
min
{
p′
∑
i∈N
yi | yiRixi for all i ∈ N
}
. (2)
If the Scitovsky set {∑i∈N yi | yiRixi for all i ∈ N} remains unchanged by a transfer of
a bundle of goods, then the sum of money metrics given by equation (2) remains un-
changed as well, irrespective of the choice of the reference price vector p. Each efficiency-
preserving transfer therefore corresponds to a mean-preserving progressive transfer in the
space of money metric utilities. Consequently, a Schur-concave social welfare function de-
fined over money metric utilities does not decrease welfare after an efficiency-preserving
transfer.
Necessity. Let % be a social ranking that satisfies anonymity, continuity, monotonicity,
reference set welfarism, and the efficiency-preserving transfer principle. Lemma 1 applies.
Lemma 2 below will show that, in addition, these axioms imply that the boundaries of
all reference sets are linear and parallel.
Together, Lemmas 1 and 2 establish that there exists a reference price vector p in
Rm++ such that the utilities obtained using equation (1) are money metric utilities up
to a strictly increasing transformation. If we choose this transformation function to be
the identity function, then the reference set utilities are equal to money metric utilities.
Because efficiency-preserving transfers correspond to mean-preserving transfers in the
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space of money metric utilities, the continuous, strictly increasing, and symmetric social
welfare function W singled out in Lemma 1 must be Schur-concave in order to satisfy
the efficiency-preserving transfer principle.
We now prove Lemma 2.
Lemma 2: A social ranking % satisfies anonymity, continuity, monotonicity, reference
set welfarism, and the efficiency-preserving transfer principle only if the boundaries of
all reference sets in the associated list S = (Sλ)λ∈R+are linear and parallel.
We proceed by contradiction. Suppose that the boundaries associated with a list of
reference sets S = (Sλ)λ∈R+ are not everywhere linear and parallel. Then it follows that
• there exist distinct bundles x1 and x2 in X such that x1 and x2 belong to ∂Sλ for
some λ > 0,
• there exists a bundle x3 such that x3  x1, x3  x2, and x3 belongs to ∂Sλ′ for
some λ′ > λ,
• there exists a bundle x4 such that x4  x1, x4  x2, and x4 = x3 + t(x2 − x1) for
some t in R,
but x4 does not belong to ∂Sλ′ .
Figure A1 illustrates such a case for m = 2. Note that bundle x4 belongs to ∂Sλ′′ ,
with λ′′ > λ′ (the case λ′′ < λ′ is analogous).
We consider the lowest possible reference set boundary that is tangent to the closed
line segment [x1, x2] and denote it by ∂Sα.
19 The boundary ∂Sα is uniquely defined
19By construction, we have that α ≤ λ.
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and the tangent bundles ∂Sα ∩ [x1, x2] form a closed set. From that set, we select the
tangent bundle that is closest to bundle x1 and call it y. Bundle y is unique and distinct
from bundle x2.
20 Figure A2 illustrates the reference set boundary ∂Sα and bundle y.
Analogously, we consider the lowest possible reference set boundary that is tangent to
the closed line segment [x3, x4] and denote it by ∂Sβ. We select the tangency bundle z
in ∂Sβ ∩ [x3, x4] that is closest to bundle x4. Bundle z is unique and distinct from x4.21
Figure A2 illustrates the reference set boundary ∂Sβ and bundle z.
By construction, we have that z  y  0. In addition, no bundle on the closed
line segment [y, x2] belongs to the interior of Sα and no bundle on the half-open line
segment (z, x4] belongs to the interior or boundary of Sβ. Because y 6= x2 and z 6= x4,
we can choose a bundle δ such that no bundle in the closed line segment [y, y+δ] ⊆ [y, x2]
belongs to the interior of Sα and no bundle in the half-open line segment (z, z−δ] ⊆ (z, x4]
belongs to the interior or boundary of Sβ. Figure A3 illustrates the construction of y+ δ
and z − δ. The original boundaries ∂Sλ and ∂Sλ′ have been removed from the figure for
clarity, whereas the boundary ∂Sγ through the bundle z − δ is added. Note that γ > β.
Based on these line segments, we now construct four kinked indifference surfaces.
The first indifference surface is based on the closed line segment [y, y + δ]. Construct
the set B1 that contains the bundles that vector-dominate the bundles in [y, y + δ], i.e.,
B1 = {x ∈ X |x ≥ x′ for some x′ in [y, y + δ]}. By construction, the set B1 is closed,
monotone (if x belongs to B1, then also x
′ ≥ x belongs to B1), and convex. Hence,
20Suppose y = x2. Bundle x2 must then be a tangent bundle by definition. This is possible only if
α = λ (otherwise, the boundaries ∂Sα and ∂Sλ are different, but tangent in x2, which is not admitted).
But if α = λ, then also x1 is a tangent bundle that is obviously closer to x1 than x2 is. Hence, we must
have y = x1 6= x2, a contradiction.
21If z = x4, then β = λ
′′ > λ′. This is not possible because we must have β ≤ λ′ since the boundary
∂Sβ is the lowest possible boundary.
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the boundary ∂B1 is an indifference surface of a continuous, monotone, and convex
preference relation. Analogously, we construct another indifference surface, denoted by
∂B′2, based on the set of bundles B
′
2 that vector-dominate the bundles in [z, z−δ]. Figure
A4 illustrates the boundaries ∂B1 and ∂B
′
2.
To construct the final two indifference surfaces, we consider an arbitrary bundle
v that satisfies v  y, z  v, and z − δ  v, and we define bundle w such that
w = (z− δ) + (v− y) z− δ. We construct two other indifference surfaces, denoted by
∂B′1 and ∂B2, based on the sets of bundles B
′
1 and B2 that vector-dominate the bundles
v and w, respectively. By construction, the four indifference surfaces have no bundles in
common and can therefore be assumed to belong to the same preference relation in R.
We consider an efficiency-preserving transfer between two individuals with an identi-
cal preference ordering that contains these four indifference surfaces. We assign the lower
19
two indifference surfaces ∂B1 and ∂B
′
1 to individual 1 and the upper two indifference sur-
faces ∂B2 and ∂B
′
2 to individual 2. Let y and w be the bundles of individuals 1 and 2
before the transfer and let v and z − δ be their bundles after the transfer. This richer-
to-poorer transfer is efficiency-preserving. It preserves the societal bundle: the societal
bundle before the transfer is y + w, the societal bundle after the transfer is v + (z − δ),
and we have that y+w = v+ (z− δ). The transfer also preserves the Scitovsky set: the
Scitovsky set before the transfer is equal to the set of bundles that vector-dominate at
least one bundle in [y + w, (y + δ) + w], the Scitovsky set after the transfer is equal to
the set of bundles that vector-dominate at least one bundle in [v + (z − δ), v + z], and
we have that [y + w, (y + δ) + w] = [v + (z − δ), v + z].
Finally, note that bundle v can be chosen arbitrarily close to y with v  y. Choosing
a closer bundle such as v implies by definition that bundle w shifts closer to bundle
z− δ and that the indifference surfaces through v and w shift accordingly. The resulting
transfer remains efficiency-preserving. It is thus possible to construct a sequence of
efficiency-preserving transfers with v approaching y arbitrarily close, and as a result, w
approaching z − δ arbitrarily close.
Since W is Schur-concave, each transfer in this sequence does not decrease social
welfare. Because the social welfare function W is continuous in the space of reference
set utilities and the reference set utility function is continuous in bundles, in the limit
we get W (α, β, . . .) ≥ W (α, γ, . . .). But, because γ > β and W is strictly increasing, we
obtain a contradiction.
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